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BLACK-WHITE SEGREGATION, DISCRIMINATION, 
AND HOME ONWNERSHIP 
 
Abstract 
 
The effect of discrimination on black-white racial segregation is studied using a confidential 
supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  Audit studies reveal that the rate of 
discrimination in rental housing is substantially higher than in owner-occupied housing.  Thus, a 
variable indicating home ownership is used to proxy for the discrimination rate faced by blacks.  The 
fixed-effects estimates of segregation imply that home ownership is associated with a decline in 
black-white segregation.  This effect decreases slightly at higher income levels but increases 
substantially with the education of the head of household.  Evidence is presented that the effect of 
discrimination on segregation disappears in cross-sectional data but reappears when using a panel 
and controlling for fixed-effects. The findings of this study suggest that increased government 
enforcement of fair housing laws may have a quantitatively different effect on different segments of 
society and that future research on racial segregation should emphasize the use of panel, as opposed 
to cross-sectional, data. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper uses information from a series of audit studies conducted by the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and local housing authorities to estimate the empirical 
relationship between racial discrimination in housing and racial segregation.  These audit studies, 
which send pairs of black and white testers to the same realtor or apartment complex to determine 
the presence of discrimination, not only establish that discrimination in housing markets exists, but 
also quantify how the discrimination rate varies with housing tenure (Galster [1990] and Yinger 
[1992]).  These results are used in this paper to identify a proxy for racial discrimination, a dummy 
variable indicating whether a person owns a home or rents, that can be applied to the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID).  This proxy is then used to estimate how variation in the discrimination 
rate faced by blacks is associated with variation in black-white racial segregation while holding 
constant other relevant variables. 
Homeownership is a good proxy for the discrimination rate for two reasons.  First, audit 
studies report higher rates of discrimination in rental markets than in owner-occupied housing.  
Second, rental and sales housing markets are well integrated.  Rental units and owner-occupied 
homes are found in essentially all of the neighborhoods—defined as a census tract—where PSID 
respondents reside regardless of whether the individual rents or owns a home.  To the extent that 
higher rates of discrimination in housing availability associated with rental housing increase housing 
 
 
segregation, blacks and whites with the same socio-economic characteristics should live in more 
integrated neighborhoods when they own a home compared to when they rent.  In fact this is the 
primary finding reported in this paper.  The other major finding of this paper is that the degree to 
which racial segregation decreases with homeownership varies substantially with other 
socioeconomic characteristics, particularly educational attainment.  These two results suggest that 
discrimination is an important factor contributing to black-white segregation and that the effect of 
discrimination on segregation varies considerably across individuals. 
This fusion of information found in audit studies to a nationally representative data set 
permits for the first time the construction of direct evidence on the relationship between the 
incidence of racial discrimination in housing and housing segregation.  In contrast, previous research 
on discrimination as a cause of segregation (Taeuber [1968]; Kain [1976, 1986]; and Massey and 
Denton [1993]) relies on indirect evidence derived from the residual method.  The residual method 
models segregation by explicitly controlling for factors (typically income) other than discrimination. 
It then assigns the portion of segregation not explained by the model, or the residual, to 
discrimination.  A more detailed critique of the residual method is presented in Section II. 
An empirical estimate of how discrimination affects segregation may be of interest to 
policymakers and social scientists who are concerned with the causes of racial inequalities.  Recent 
empirical studies suggest that racial segregation in housing may be partially responsible for the 
relatively poor social and economic outcomes of minorities compared to whites.  Cutler and Glaeser 
[1997] estimate that a one standard deviation decline black-white segregation would narrow the 
black-white gap in schooling (high school and college graduation rates), employment (labor force 
participation rates and earnings) and single parenthood by about one-third.  Furthermore, recent 
reviews (Kain [1992]; Holzer [1991]) of the spatial mismatch literature indicate that the employment 
prospects of central city residents, especially young and unskilled laborers, have been adversely 
affected by a geographic shift in the location of entry level jobs away from traditionally black and 
Hispanic central cities and toward typically white suburban areas.  Thus by isolating minorities to 
low job growth areas, racial segregation increases spatial mismatch and contributes to poor labor 
market outcomes.  Other studies have linked high levels of racial segregation to poor educational 
attainment (Orfield [1993, 1997]), increased infant and adult mortality rates (La Viest [1989, 1993]; 
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Polednak [1991, 1993]; and Collins and Williams [1999]), increased homicide rates (Peterson and 
Krivo [1993, 1999]) and even decreases in voter turnout (Cohen and Dawson [1983]). 
A unique aspect of this paper is its use of panel data to measure segregation.  While previous 
studies of segregation have used cross-sectional data, mostly from the decennial census, this study 
uses a confidential supplement to the PSID.  Using the PSID instead of data from the decennial 
census has several advantages.  First, most nationally representative panel data sets, such as the 
PSID, have more detailed information on individual characteristics compared to data derived from 
the decennial census.  For confidentiality reasons, data from the decennial census are limited to race, 
census tract, and one socioeconomic variable of interest, typically income.  The advantage of using 
the confidential supplement of the PSID is that researchers are able to control for a wider range of 
factors when modeling racial segregation.  Second, panel data allow the use of individual specific 
(fixed) effects.  Using fixed-effects in a model of segregation is appealing because under a 
reasonable assumption they can be interpreted as preferences over the racial composition of one’s 
neighborhood.  The necessary assumption is that these preferences are stable over time.  Controlling 
for these preferences is important because presumably voluntary segregation is an important aspect 
of black-white segregation.1  Thus, the researcher who uses panel data can simultaneously control 
for very detailed individual-level socioeconomic characteristics, the preferences of the individual 
and the discrimination rate by using homeownership as a proxy. 
Furthermore, evidence is presented here that the omission of fixed-effects leads to a large 
bias in the model’s parameter estimates.  This bias is severe enough that the estimated effect of 
discrimination on segregation is reduced to, on average, zero when fixed-effects are ignored but is 
quantitatively large and statistically significant when fixed-effects are added. 
Previous research on racial segregation has relied exclusively on cross-sectional data, such as 
the decennial census, most likely because current measures of segregation are defined over the 
population of a geographic region, such as a metropolitan area, and therefore can only be applied to 
data sets from censuses.  For this reason, prior research on racial segregation measures has ignored 
nationally representative survey data such as the PSID that includes samples from many different 
geographic regions but no population counts.  In order to overcome this limitation, a new measure of 
                                                          
1See Schelling [1971] for a discussion of how black and white preferences over the racial composition of one=s 
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racial segregation is developed in this paper, which is defined over a nationally representative 
sample taken across several metropolitan areas. 
The essay is organized as follows.  Section II provides a critique of the residual method.  
Section III reviews evidence from audit studies and shows that the rate of discrimination in rental 
housing is substantially higher than in owner-occupied housing. Section IV develops a segregation 
measure that can be applied to data sampled from many different geographic regions.  Section V 
discusses the data and sample restrictions.  A simple method for calculating the new segregation 
measure is found in section VI.  Section VII lays out the estimation strategy and presents the fixed-
effects results.  Section VIII compares the fixed-effects results to results obtained when the PSID is 
treated as a cross-section.  Section IX concludes. 
 
II.  A CRITIQUE OF THE RESIDUAL METHOD 
 
Several researchers have speculated that housing segregation could be reduced through 
policies that lower the discrimination rate in housing.  Yet this claim relies on indirect evidence from 
studies that utilize the residual method (for example, Taeuber [1968]; Kain [1976, 1986]; and 
Massey and Denton [1993]), an empirical strategy that estimates the effect of inter-racial economic 
differences on racial segregation and then assigns the remaining unexplained component to housing 
discrimination. 
These studies assume that the effect of discrimination on segregation can be measured by 
examining the segregation of blacks and whites that have similar social or economic characteristics.  
The assumption used in these studies is that discrimination is the only cause of segregation that 
remains after controlling for inter-racial economic differences.  Typically, such studies construct a 
segregation measure2 conditional on a single dimension of economic status, usually income.  For 
each income group, this segregation measure is computed for all black and white individuals who 
fall within a given range of income.  For instance, for 30 different MSAs Massey and Denton [1993] 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
neighborhood may interact to produce voluntary segregation in housing. 
2The most commonly used segregation measure is the dissimilarity index, a measure that is bounded between 
zero and one and represents the percentage of blacks that would have to move in order to achieve full integration.  See 
Cortese, Falk and Cohen (1976) for a fuller discussion of segregation indices. 
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calculate a segregation measure for blacks and whites who have annual incomes less than $2,500, 
between $25,000 and $27,500, and more than $50,000. On average the segregation measure is equal 
to 74.4 for blacks and whites in the low-income category, 66.7 for those with incomes in the middle 
range and 72.8 for those with high incomes.  The finding that higher levels of economic status do not 
result in substantially lower levels of racial segregation then forms the basis for the claim that 
discrimination is the principal cause of segregation. 
There are three important limitations to this methodology.  First, housing segregation is 
caused not only by economic inequality and discrimination but also by other important factors, such 
as voluntary segregation.  One would expect such factors to be in the “residual” segregation not 
explained by inter-racial income differences.  Thus, the effect of discrimination on segregation is not 
identified. 
Second, even if the residual method could identify the total effect of discrimination on 
segregation, the effect of a discrete reduction in discrimination on segregation would not be known.  
Causation and responsiveness are logically separate concepts.  For instance, if a zero price implies 
infinite demand for a good, it does not follow that all price reductions for that good will result in an 
elastic change in demand.  Likewise, while it might be the case that discrimination is largely 
responsible for black-white segregation, it does not follow that a policy that effectively reduces, but 
does not eliminate, discrimination would substantially decrease housing segregation.  The function 
that maps discrimination into segregation may have a few flat spots, even if it passes through the 
origin.  Thus, even if the residual method accurately identifies the aggregate effect of discrimination 
on segregation, it would not identify the effect of a policy that reduces but does not eliminate 
discrimination. 
Third, the effect of discrimination on segregation may vary across different groups within 
minority communities.  By construction, the residual method cannot be sensitive to this issue.  
According to this technique, if the segregation levels of high and low income blacks are similar 
(different) then discrimination is said to be an important (unimportant) determinant of segregation.  
Yet this comparison requires that high and low income blacks be equally responsive to 
discrimination.  To the extent that this responsiveness varies by economic status, the residual method 
mis-measures the aggregate effect of discrimination on segregation. 
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The methodology presented here addresses these shortcomings.  First, because the PSID 
contains detailed information on individuals, the estimates of segregation in this paper are able to 
control for a richer set of socioeconomic variables compared to previous studies.  Second, the proxy 
used in this case corresponds to a discrete change in the discrimination rate that may be similar to a 
change in enforcement policy that produces a moderate decline in the discrimination rate.  If so, the 
estimates found in this paper might be used by policymakers to predict the possible impact of 
increased enforcement of fair housing laws on segregation.  Third, by interacting a proxy for the 
discrimination rate with socioeconomic characteristics, it is possible to identify how the impact of 
discrimination on segregation might vary with these variables of interest. 
 
III.  THE AUDIT EVIDENCE 
 
The only direct evidence on the rate of discrimination in housing comes from audit studies.  
A fair housing audit pairs a white tester with a black or Hispanic tester.  Each tester in a pair is given 
a similar false identity and visits the same rental unit or realtor.  At the end of their visit, each tester 
independently logs information about their visit, including information presented to them regarding 
the availability of housing.  In the HUD supervised audits, discrimination is said to occur if the black 
or Hispanic tester is treated less favorably than the white tester in at least one category while the 
white tester is always treated at least as well as the black or Hispanic tester.  The audit is termed 
ambiguous and no discrimination is said to occur if both testers were treated less favorably than the 
other in at least one category. 
HUD has conducted two national studies of discrimination in housing, one in 1977 (Wienk et 
al. [1979]) and one in the summer of 1989 (Yinger [1991]).  The 1977 HUD study inspired a number 
of local housing authorities to conduct their own audit studies during the 1980s.  Galster [1990] 
reviews these audit studies.  These three studies comprise the only nationwide evidence of the 
pattern of housing discrimination in the United States. 
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There are several dimensions along which the treatment of auditors is recorded: housing 
availability, credit assistance and sales effort are three examples.  This paper focuses on 
discrimination in housing availability because it is considered the most severe form of discrimination 
in housing.  According to Wienk et al. [1979]: 
The principal focus of this study is on housing availability for two reasons.  First, 
differential treatment on housing availability is a clear violation of Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968.  Second, differential treatment on housing availability is 
the most fundamental form of discriminatory practice that a black apartment seeker 
might encounter.  If a rental agent told one auditor that no apartments were available 
but told the other auditor that something was available, it matters little whether both 
auditors received the same treatment for each of the other items. Therefore, 
differential treatment on apartment availability is considered most important.3  (p. 
ES-6 – ES-7) 
 
Other types of behavior that qualify as differential treatment in housing availability include 
differences in the type of housing made available, the number of units inspected, information on 
waiting lists and the number of units shown. This contrasts with discrimination in housing 
availability in the sales market.  This type of discrimination occurs when a realtor falsely claims that 
a home is not for sale, offers multiple listing directories to minority customers at a lower rate 
compared to white customers, or restricts the number of homes offered for inspection or actually 
inspected to minority customers compared to white customers. 
A key issue in the measurement of discrimination is distinguishing random unfavorable 
treatment from systematic discrimination (Heckman [1992], Yinger [1992]).  The former may be the 
result of random factors such as a realtor’s mood or the time of day and likely would have little or no 
effect on racial segregation in housing since both minority and whites would receive such treatment 
with equal probability.  The latter, however, is likely the result of prejudice against minorities and 
presumably can have a large effect on racial segregation in housing because it systematically 
excludes minorities from certain neighborhoods.  Random unequal treatment can cause individual 
instances of unequal treatment to overstate or understate the presence of systematic discrimination.  
For instance, random factors may cause a discriminating landlord to favor a minority auditor during 
a particular audit or may cause a non-discriminating landlord to favor the white auditor. 
Two methods are used in audit studies to discern the rate of discrimination in data that report 
instead the rate of unfavorable treatment.  The first method assumes that minority auditors receive 
favorable treatment only as a result of random variation in the behavior of realtors and rental agents. 
                                                          
3When discussing discrimination in sales units, Wienk makes essentially the same argument, stating that 
discrimination in housing availability is the most important form of discrimination faced by black house seekers (ES3–
14). 
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Thus, the discrimination rate is taken to be the difference of the rate of favorable treatment for white 
auditors and the rate of favorable treatment for minority auditors.  Suppose, for example, that white 
auditors were favored in 30 percent of the audits and minority auditors were favored 10 percent of 
the time.  Then this methodology would imply a discrimination rate equal to 20 percent.  This “net 
incidence” measure is reported as a measure of discrimination in all three major national studies of 
racial discrimination.4 
Yinger [1991] points out that the “net incidence” measure may understate the actual rate of 
discrimination.  As previously noted, random factors may lead a discriminating realtor or rental 
agent to favor a minority auditor, yet using the “net incidence” measure such an audit would not be 
counted as discriminatory.  Yinger proposes constructing a measure of systematic discrimination 
using the predicted values of a logistic regression.  The dependent variable is the probability that a 
minority auditor is treated less favorably, more favorably or the same as the white tester and the 
independent variables include characteristics of the testers, realtors and rental agents.  If unfavorable 
treatment of the minority auditor is the most likely of the three outcomes then the audit is classified 
as discriminatory. 
The findings of these studies are presented in table 1.  The 1977 HUD study and Galster’s 
review of audits by local housing authorities report only the “net incidence” discrimination rate 
measure.  Both the “net incidence” and logit measure are reported for the 1989 HUD study.  Housing 
audits conducted by HUD in 1977 in 40 different metropolitan areas found that blacks confront 
racial discrimination 27 percent of the time in rental units and 15 percent of the time in owner-
occupied housing (Wienk et al. [1979]).  HUD repeated the 1977 study in the summer of 1989 using 
20 metropolitan areas.  Using the logit measure, discrimination in housing availability against blacks 
occurred in 46.9 percent of the rental units and 34.2 percent of the sales units in 1989.  In that same 
follow-up study, discrimination occurred 21.3 percent of the time in rental units and 18.0 percent of 
the time in sales units according to the “net incidence” measure. 
                                                          
4Yinger [1992] also reports the raw rate of unfavorable treatment as a discrimination measure.  This “gross 
incidence” measure has the disadvantage of ignoring random factors that lead to unfavorable treatment and thus, likely 
overestimates the actual discrimination rate.  Nevertheless, the gross incidence measure is useful because it likely 
provides an upper bound on the true discrimination rate. 
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Galster [1990] reviewed the results of 71 housing audits carried out by local housing 
authorities during the 1980s.  The total number of audit studies available to calculate the rate of 
discrimination against blacks in housing availability is unfortunately lower.  A number of the audit 
studies focus on discrimination against Hispanics and so are not applicable.  Furthermore, many of 
the written reports that Galster received in response to his survey were incomplete.  Nevertheless 
Galster found that the incidence of racial discrimination against blacks is 47 percent in rental 
markets and 21 percent in owner-occupied housing markets. 
Table 2 presents the results of equality of means tests5 for the discrimination rates in rental 
and sales units.  It seems unlikely that the different discrimination rates across rental and sales 
markets reported in Galster’s study and the 1977 HUD report are the result of chance.  The p-value 
for an equality of means tests for both of these studies is 0.00.  However, the p-value for an equality 
of means test for the 1989 HUD study is higher (0.07).  In the last row of table 2 an equality of 
means test is conducted in which the data from the three studies are combined.  In this case, the p-
value for the equality of means test is 0.00.  Thus, even though the 1989 HUD audits appear to 
provide the weakest evidence of higher discrimination rates in rental markets, the cumulative 
evidence from all three audits taken together strongly indicates that black renters face higher rates of 
discrimination than blacks searching in the sales market.  
These results are not surprising given the different financial incentives and the differences in 
black-white contact after a contract is signed in the two markets.  Most homeowners have a 
relatively large percentage of wealth at risk when they sell their house compared to the percentage of 
their wealth that apartment owners risk when attempting to rent a single unit (see Eller and Wallace 
[1995], Table A, page 3).  Thus, risk averse, racially biased homeowners should be more willing to 
sell to blacks than similarly risk averse, racially biased apartment owners would be willing to rent to 
blacks.  Moreover, many rental agents are salaried while realtors work on commission.  
                                                          
5The method used here is the standard equality of means of two independent samples.  The random variable in 
question in these three audit studies, whether or not an individual experiences discrimination, follows a Bernoulli 
process.  A Bernoulli process is fully characterized by its mean and thus any assumption that the populations of two 
Bernoulli processes have the same mean necessarily implies that these two populations have the same variance.  For this 
reason the test used here is an equality of means test in which it is also assumed that the two samples have the same 
variance (Greene, [1997]). 
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Furthermore, when a white owner sells a house to a black buyer, black-white contact is limited to 
negotiations and closing.  After closing the deal the buyer and seller may never meet again.  In 
contrast, a landlord and tenant have a relationship after the rental agreement is signed.  Therefore, 
white homeowners and realtors with equal tastes for discrimination have more financial and personal 
incentives to sell to black buyers than similar rental agents have to rent to black tenants. 
 
IV.  MEASURING SEGREGATION IN PANEL DATA 
 
Traditional measures of segregation6 are defined over geographic regions, such as a 
metropolitan area.  Typically these measures are used with census data to assign an index of 
segregation to major metropolitan areas in the United States.  Since these measures are defined over 
geographic areas they can be used only with data that provides information on all locales within a 
geographic area.  As such, these measures cannot be applied to nationally representative survey data. 
Since this study uses data from the PSID, a nationally representative survey data set, a new 
segregation measure is needed.  Let ∆(X) be defined as the difference in the average proportion of 
blacks in the neighborhoods of observationally equivalent black and white individuals or, 
mathematically,  
 
(1) ]0,[]1,[)( ==−===∆ BxXbEBxXbEX
 
where b is the percentage of blacks in a person’s neighborhood, X is a vector of socioeconomic 
variables such as income and education, B is a dummy variable equal to one if a person is black and 
                                                          
6The most popular traditional measure of segregation is the dissimilarity index (D) which is defined as 
D
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P
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=
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where the summation is over neighborhoods j = 1, 2 …, n within the metropolitan area, pj is the number of black people 
living in neighborhood j, wj is the number of white people living in neighborhood j, P is the number of black people in 
the MSA and W is the number of white people in the MSA.  This index ranges from zero to one and is commonly 
interpreted as the proportion of minority individuals who would need to move in order for each neighborhood to have an 
equal proportion of minorities.  This measure cannot be applied to a typical panel data set because these data sets usually 
do not provide information on the minority and total populations in each neighborhood within a metropolitan area 
(Taeuber, [1968]). 
 
 
11 
the expectation is taken over individuals in the sample.  ∆(X) range from –1 to 1 and applies to 
individuals with the same set of socioeconomic characteristics X, rather than to individuals in the 
same metropolitan area.7  Thus of racial segregation is simply an artifact of economic segregation 
then ∆(X) should be equal to zero. 
∆(X) can also be used to measure segregation across different housing markets.  Let ∆r(X) 
and ∆h(X) denote the ∆(X) segregation measure taken over rental and owner-occupied housing units, 
respectively.  These two quantities are defined as 
 
(2) ]0,1,[]1,1,[)( ===−====∆ BRxXbEBRxXbEXr
 
(3) ]0,0,[]1,0,[)( ===−====∆ BRxXbEBRxXbEXh
 
where R is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual rents.  Then, provided three assumptions 
detailed below, the difference ∆r(X) – ∆h(X) quantifies the effect that the additional discrimination 
found in rental compared to sales markets has on segregation. 
If one assumes that 1) segregation due to sorting is constant across rental and owner-
occupied housing markets; 2) the function that maps discrimination into segregation is the same 
across both rental and owner-occupied housing; and 3) the discrimination and voluntary sorting 
components of segregation are additive, then ∆r(X) – ∆h(X) will measure only the increase in 
                                                          
7∆(X) is a modification of the Isolation index (Ebb) which is given by 
∑
=
===
n
j
j
j
bb BbEbP
p
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1
]1[  
where pj is the number of blacks in neighborhood j, P is the population of blacks in the MSA, B is a dummy variable 
equal to one is an individual is black and bj is the proportion of residents of neighborhood j who are black.  
Subtracting from this mean the same expectation taken over whites yields a quantity (∆) equal to the average 
difference in the proportion of blacks in a black and white person’s neighborhood 
]0[]1[ =−==∆ BbEBbE  
To account for differences in economic status between whites and blacks, convert the above unconditional 
expectations into conditional expectations, 
]0,[]1,[ ==−===∆ BxXbEBxXbE  
where X is a vector of variables describing the economic status of a given individual. 
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segregation due to the higher discrimination rate found in rental relative to owner-occupied housing. 
 Note that if 
(4)  ∆r(X) = δ(αr) + s 
 
(5)  ∆h(X) = δ(αh) + s 
 
then 
 
(6)  ∆r(X) – ∆h(X) = δ(αr) – δ(αh) 
 
where αr and αh are the discrimination rates in the rental and sales markets, s is the component of 
segregation due to voluntary sorting and δ(αr) and δ(αh) are the components of segregation due to the 
rates of discrimination in the rental and sales markets respectively.  If ∆r(X) and ∆h(X) each consist 
of a discrimination component plus a sorting component and if the two sorting components are 
equal, then when ∆h(X) is subtracted from ∆r(X) the two sorting components cancel, leaving only the 
difference of the two discrimination components. 
Provided that ∆r(X) – ∆h(X) is positive, this difference can also be interpreted as a lower 
bound on the decrease in segregation that would occur from eliminating discrimination in the rental 
housing market.  Let the hypothetical change in segregation in the rental market due to an 
elimination of racial discrimination be given by ∆r(X) – ∆0(X), where ∆0(X) is the level of 
segregation corresponding to a discrimination rate equal to zero.  Because one would expect a 
positive relationship between the discrimination rate and segregation, it seems reasonable to assume 
that ∆h(X) is at least as large as ∆0(X).  If ∆h(X) is greater than ∆0(X), then it follows that ∆r(X) – 
∆0(X) is greater than or equal to ∆r(X) – ∆h(X). 
 
V.  DATA AND SAMPLE RESTRICTIONS 
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The data used in this study comes from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  The 
PSID contains information on a sample of approximately 37,500 U.S. individuals (men, women and 
children) and their families beginning in 1968.  Because the original intent of the study was to 
facilitate the study of poverty, the PSID over-samples low-income individuals.  The core data is 
collected annually and contains economic and demographic information.  Special attention is given 
to income amounts and sources, employment history, family composition and residential location.  
However, the only geographic data found in the core data set is aggregated at the state level. 
A confidential supplemental data set, the PSID Geocode Match Files, has been acquired with 
permission from the Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan.  This data set 
provides a detailed portrait of the neighborhood environment of the PSID respondents from 1968–
1985.  The data set is unique because of the level of disaggregation of the neighborhood variables.  
The PSID Geocode Match Files is the only United State data set that provides geographic 
information at the census tract/block numbering area level.  A census tract/block numbering area is a 
small, relatively permanent area containing approximately 5,000 people.  Usually census tracts are 
found in urban areas, while block-numbering areas are usually found in more rural regions. 
For every year of the survey, individuals are assigned several geocodes.  The geocodes 
designate the country, state, county, zip code, and census tract/block numbering area of residence for 
each respondent.  Two sets of geocodes are provided: codes which correspond to the coding scheme 
used by the Census Bureau for the 1970 census and codes which correspond to the coding scheme 
used by the Census Bureau for the 1980 census.  In addition to the raw geocodes, ISR provides two 
extract files from the 1970 and 1980 population censuses.  These files contain geocodes as well as 
descriptive statistics.  Information on the geocodes includes empirical income distributions, racial 
composition, welfare participation, labor force participation and occupational mix.  The census files 
can then be merged with the individual and family files by the selected geocodes to create a data set 
that contains detailed individual, familial and neighborhood characteristics. 
The only neighborhood characteristic extracted from the Geocode Match Files is the 
percentage of blacks in a person’s census tract/block numbering area (hereafter called “percent 
black”).  If no data were available from a person’s census tract/block numbering area then the data 
from the person’s enumeration district were used.  An enumeration district is the work area of a 
census enumerator and is approximately the same size as a census tract. 
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For 1968–1970 only data from the 1970 census were used to calculate percent black.  For 
1980–1985 only data from the 1980 census were used to calculate percent black.  For 1971–1979 a 
weighted average of percent black from the 1980 census and percent black from the 1970 census was 
used to calculate percent black for each year.  The weights given to each census data point sum to 
one and diminish as the absolute difference between the year in question and the year of the census 
increase.  For example, in 1974 and 1977 the data from the 1970 census were given a weight of 0.6 
and 0.3 respectively and the data from the 1980 census were given a weight of 0.4 and 0.7 
respectively. 
For every year that a head of household is in his prime earning years, 25 to 65 years old, the 
following variables were extracted from the PSID individual, family and Geocode Match Files:  
• the percentage of blacks in the person’s census tract or enumeration district,  
• the MSA of residence, 
• the year of the survey, 
• the family’s income to needs ratio,  
• the education of the head of the household,  
• the census region of residence,  
• whether the family rented, owned its home or neither, and  
• the race of the head of household. 
The PSID constructs the income to needs ratio by dividing nominal family income by a measure of 
the poverty level based on the family’s food needs expressed in 1968 dollars.  The numerator was 
deflated to 1968 dollars using the January Consumer’s Price Index from 1968 and the year in which 
the income was earned.   
The education variable was converted to three dummy variables.  High school is equal to one 
if a person has a high school degree or equivalent and has not received any college training.  Some 
college is equal to one if a person has a high school degree and has received some college training 
but has not received a four-year degree.  College is equal to one if a person has a four-year college 
degree.  The census region of residence variable was converted to a dummy variable (South) which 
is equal to one if a person lives in the Southern Census region (DE, MD, DC, VA, WV, KY, TN, 
NC, SC, GA, FL, AL, MS, AR, LA, TX, and OK).  The variable describing housing status was 
converted to a dummy variable (Rent) equal to one if the family was renting, equal to zero if it 
owned its home and was coded as missing otherwise.  The variable describing the race of the head of 
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household was converted to a dummy variable (Black) equal to one if the individual was black and 
equal to zero otherwise. 
Since the audit data reviewed applies only to discrimination against blacks, the sample is 
restricted to black and white head of households.  A small number of individuals classified 
themselves as black and white in different survey years.  These individuals were excluded from the 
sample. 
Inference is restricted to heads of households who are observed both renting and owning a 
home in the same MSA while in the panel in order to avoid confounding the independent effect of 
homeownership on segregation with the effect of migration across MSAs.8  For example, suppose an 
individual rented an apartment in Chicago from 1968–1969, lived in a Chicago area home from 
1970–1980, then lived in a Milwaukee home from 1981–1985.  This individual would be in the 
sample from 1968–1980.  The years in Milwaukee would be excluded since the individual did not 
both rent and own a home while living in this metropolitan area. 
Table 3 provides some summary statistics for the 25,297 annual observations included in the 
sample used for analysis.  From 1968–1985, 48 percent of the sample is black, 42 percent live in the 
South, and 43 percent rent.  The head of households typically have 1.6 children living with them, 
have a family income 2.8 times the poverty rate and live in a neighborhood composed of 37 percent 
blacks.  Sixty percent (0.3053 + 0.1491 + 0.1453) of these heads of household have a high school 
degree or more while only 15 percent have a four-year college degree. 
The difference between blacks and whites, renters and homeowners are striking.  Blacks are 
much poorer than non-blacks, have a lower probability of receiving a high school diploma and a 
much lower probability of receiving a four-year college degree.  Blacks are more likely to live in the 
South, are more likely to rent and have more children.  Blacks typically live in a neighborhood 
composed of 70 percent blacks while whites typically live in a neighborhood consisting of five 
percent blacks.  Similarly, renters are poorer and less educated (lower rates of high school and 
college graduation) than homeowners, are more likely to live in the South and typically live in a 
                                                          
8This sample restriction decreases the measured effect of homeownership on segregation.  When the fixed-
effects model detailed in Section VII is estimated using the unrestricted sample, the implied decrease in segregation 
associated with homeownership is substantially larger compared to the decline in segregation that is implied by the 
coefficient estimates obtained from the same model using the restricted sample. 
 
 
16 
neighborhood with a higher percentage of blacks.  However, unlike the black to non-black 
comparison, renters have fewer children than homeowners.  Renters are also more likely to be black 
than are homeowners. 
The data also reveal that most people who rent live in neighborhoods with a substantial 
proportion of people who own and vice-versa.  Renters live in census tracts in which 46 percent of 
the people are homeowners.  Homeowners live in neighborhoods in which 31percent of the people 
are renters.  Of the 25,297 person-year observations, there are only six in which people live in 
census tracts containing either all renters or all homeowners.  The fact that these markets overlap 
suggests that people choose over a reasonably similar set of census tracts when they own versus 
when they rent holding constant income, education and other relevant variables.  
 
VI.  A SIMPLE APPROACH 
 
Some simple calculations of the effect of homeownership on segregation using the data set 
described in the previous section are presented in table 4.  Row A gives the mean proportion of 
blacks in a black renter’s neighborhood by educational attainment of the head of household.  Row B 
gives the mean proportion of blacks in a white renter’s neighborhood by educational attainment of 
the head of household.  Row C is Row A minus Row B, the segregation measure proposed in this 
paper, ∆(X), for renters.  Rows D, E, and F are analogous to Rows A, B, and C but refer to 
homeowners.  Row G, which is equal to Row C minus Row F, gives the change in segregation 
associated with homeownership for each educational group.  The only conditioning variable (X) used 
to construct this table is the education of the head of household.  As will be seen in Section VII, 
educational attainment of the head of household is quantitatively the most important determinant of 
segregation.  Other factors, most significantly income, are ignored in this simple analysis.  These 
factors are incorporated into a fuller model in Section VII. 
Row A reveals that, on average, black renters with no high school diploma live in a census 
tract or enumeration district with 76.9 percent blacks.  Black renters with a high school diploma on 
average live in neighborhoods with 70.3 percent blacks and those with some college training on 
average live in neighborhoods with 65.8 percent blacks.  The mean neighborhood black proportion 
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for black renters with college degrees is 53.8 percent.  Row A indicates the isolation of black renters 
declines with educational attainments. 
Row B indicates that for white renters the average proportion of their neighbors that are 
black is substantially lower the corresponding figures for black renters.  White renters with no high 
school diploma live in neighborhoods composed of 8.8 percent blacks, on average.  The figures for 
white renters with a high school degree, some college training and a college degree are 5 percent, 5 
percent, and 6.5 percent respectively.  In contrast to black renters, there is no clear relation between 
educational attainment and the racial composition of white renter’s neighborhoods. 
Row C reports the difference of Row A and Row B, which is the ∆(X) segregation measure.  
The entries in this row indicate that segregation among renters declines as educational attainments 
increase.  This decline is particularly steep for college educated individuals. 
Rows D, E, and F repeat the same analysis as Rows A, B, and C but for homeowners instead 
of renters.  Row D indicates that the isolation of black homeowners sharply declines with education. 
 Black homeowners with no high school diploma on average live in neighborhoods with 73 percent 
blacks compared to neighborhoods with on average 42.4 percent blacks for college-educated blacks. 
 The mean proportion of blacks in white homeowners’ neighborhoods declines with education but 
this decline is minimal compared to the decline experienced by black homeowners.  White 
homeowners with no high school diploma on average live in neighborhoods with 5.6 percent blacks 
compared to neighborhoods with on average 3.8 percent blacks for college graduates. 
The difference in segregation between homeowners and renters is given in Row G, which is 
the difference of Row C (segregation among renters by educational attainment) and Row F 
(segregation among homeowners by educational attainment).  In general, homeownership is 
associated with a decline in segregation but this effect is small or moderate for individuals without a 
four-year college degree.  For individuals with no high school diploma, a high school diploma or 
some college training, homeownership is associated with a one to five percentage point decline in 
segregation.  However, this effect is more pronounced for college graduates who on average 
experience a 10.7 percentage point decline in segregation when they move from a rental to a sales 
unit. 
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VII.  MODEL SPECIFICATION AND FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATES 
 
A statistical model of the proportion of blacks in a person’s census tract is used to construct 
the segregation measure (∆(X)) and the difference in difference (∆r(X) – ∆h(X)) used to quantify the 
effect of discrimination on segregation.  The model states that the proportion of blacks in a person’s 
neighborhood is a function of a time effect, an MSA specific effect, whether an individual lives in 
the South, an individual’s race, family income, the education of the head of household and the 
discrimination rate, which is captured by the housing tenure variable.  In addition, an individual 
specific fixed effect is included in the model.9  The fixed-effects specification was chosen over 
random effects because a Hausman specification test rejected the null hypothesis that the random 
effects and fixed-effects coefficients are identical.  Under the assumption of constant preferences 
over time, this fixed effect can be interpreted as the propensity of an individual to live in a 
neighborhood with a high black proportion.  Mathematically, the model is a linear probability10 
model for grouped data with fixed-effects and is given by 
 
(7) ititiiititiititiitititittiit eRBBRXBRXBXRXMSAb +β+β+β+β+β+β+β+β+γ+µ= 76543210
 
where bit is the proportion of blacks in a person’s neighborhood, µi is a fixed effect for each 
individual in the sample, γt is a constant term for year t, MSAit is a dummy variable for each 
metropolitan area in the sample, Xit is a 1 x 5 vector of socioeconomic variables including the 
family’s income to needs ratio, the education of the head of household11 and a dummy variable equal 
to one if a person resides in the southern census region, Rit is a dummy variable equal to one if 
                                                          
9The most general way to control for individual heterogeneity is by using fixed-effects.  Unlike random effects, 
the use of fixed-effects does not require an assumption that individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the other right 
hand side variables.  The fixed-effects model does have one major disadvantage.  As mentioned previously, the 
coefficients on time invariant variables, such as the race of the head of household, are not identified.  Despite this loss of 
information, the linearity assumption permits the calculation of ∆r(X) – ∆h(X) as will be shown below. 
10The rationale for choosing the linear probability model specification is given in Appendix I. 
11The education variable is parsed into three dummy variables (High school, Some college, and College) as 
described in Section V. 
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person i rents at time t, Bi is a dummy variable equal to one if person i is black, and eit ~ IID(0, σ ).  
It is assumed that eit is uncorrelated with MSAit, γt, Xit, Rit, Bi and µi.12 
2
e
Note that Rit and Bi have been interacted with Xit in such a way as to allow white 
homeowners, white renters, black homeowners and black renters to have different coefficients on the 
socio-economic variables included in Xit.  For example, β2 and β5 parameterize the difference 
between the expected proportion of blacks in a white renter’s neighborhood and a white 
homeowner’s neighborhood.  β5 is the effect of renting common to all renters while β2 is a vector of 
coefficients which allow the effect of renting to vary by education and income.  β3 and β6 
parameterize the effect of being black on the proportion of blacks in one’s neighborhood.  β6 
captures the effect common to all blacks while β3 allows the effect of race to vary by education and 
income.  β4 and β7 parameterizes the effect of being both black and a renter.  β7 captures the effect 
common to all black renters while β4 allows that effect to vary by education and income.  The chart 
below identifies the coefficients of the model, which belong to the four distinct groups considered in 
the above model. 
Group Relevant coefficients 
White homeowners Β1 
White renters β1, β2, β5 
Black homeowners β1, β3, β6 
Black renters β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7 
 
Since blacks in rental units face a higher rate of discrimination than blacks in sales units the 
coefficients on the “Rent x Black” variables characterize the “discrimination effect.”  Notice that in 
                                                          
12The grouped nature of the data induces heteroskedasticity in the model which can be corrected by constructing 
weights equal to  
n
p p
i
i i( )1−  
and running weighted least squares regression on the equation above.  The weights are constructed using predicted values 
from an unweighted estimation of the same equation.  About 120 observations have negative predicted values.  These are 
white individuals with high incomes living in metropolitan areas with small black populations.  The weight used to 
correct for heteroskedasticity is not defined for a negative predicted value.  For this reason a truncated predicted value is 
used instead of the actual predicted value to construct the weight.  The truncated predicted value equals 0.0001 if the 
actual predicted value is less than 0.0001.  The actual predicted value is used to construct the weight if it is greater than 
or equal to 0.0001. 
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terms of the variables and coefficients of the empirical model above, ∆r(X) can be expressed as a 
difference constructed by using the coefficients that pertain to black and white renters and ∆h(X) can 
be expressed as a difference constructed by using the coefficients that pertain to black and white 
homeowners: 
 
(8) 5217654321 )()()( β+β+β−β+β+β+β+β+β+β=∆ xxXr
 
(9) 7643 )()( β+β+β+β=∆ xxr
 
(10) )()()( 1631 β−β+β+β=∆ XXXh
 
(11) 63 )()( β+β=∆ XXh
 
Thus, 
 
(12) 74 )()()( β+β=∆−∆ XXX hr
 
That is, in order to compute the difference in difference (∆r(X) – ∆h(X)) which is the effect of the 
additional discrimination found in rental markets compared to sales markets on segregation, one may 
confine attention to the coefficients on the “Black x Rent” variables. 
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The estimation results of the linear probability model for grouped data with fixed-effects are 
presented in table 5.  The estimated coefficients on the Income-to-needs ratio, High school, Some 
college, and College imply that the level of family income and education of the head of household 
have almost no quantitatively important role in determining the proportion of blacks in a white 
homeowner’s neighborhood.  White renters live in neighborhoods that contain a slightly higher 
fraction of blacks (0.029) than white homeowners.  The estimated coefficient on Rent × Income to 
needs implies that the level of family income does not affect the proportion of blacks in white 
renter’s neighborhoods.  In contrast, the coefficients on Rent × High school (–0.034), Rent × Some 
college (–0.030) and Rent × College (–0.047) imply that the educational achievements of white 
renters do have a small negative effect on the percentage of blacks in their neighborhoods. 
The coefficient estimate on Black × Income to needs (–0.002) implies that the effect of extra 
income on the racial composition of black homeowners’ neighborhoods is practically zero.  The 
coefficient estimates on Black × High school, Black × Some college, and Black × College show that 
the educational attainments of the black homeowners is associated with a mild increase in the 
proportion of blacks in a neighborhood.  However, the predicted increase for high school graduates 
is not statistically significant. 
The coefficients on Black × Rent and Rent indicate that black renters live in neighborhoods 
with approximately 8 (0.029 + 0.055) percentage points more blacks than black homeowners.  An 
increase in the income to needs ratio of a black family that rents is associated with a small decrease 
(–0.014) in the percentage of blacks in one’s neighborhood.  However, the effect of education on 
neighborhood composition is quite dramatic for black renters.  Black high school graduates who rent 
live in neighborhoods with 13.7 (0.029 + 0.053 + 0.055) percentage points more blacks than do 
black homeowners with a high school degree.  Black renters with some college training live in 
neighborhoods with 16.2 (0.029 + 0.078 + 0.055) percentage points more blacks than do their 
counterparts who own a home.  Most dramatically, black renters with a four-year college degree live 
in neighborhoods with 23.8 (0.029 + 0.154 + 0.055) percentage points more blacks than their 
counterparts who own a home. 
The cumulative effect of these coefficients on changes in racial segregation across rental and 
sales markets is shown in Table 6.  In this table, the predicted increases in racial segregation in rental 
markets compared to sales markets are presented for the four education groups and for three income 
to needs ratios for each education category.  For instance, a black high school dropout with an 
income to needs ratio of one would expect to live in a neighborhood with four percentage points 
fewer blacks when he owns a home compared to when he rents.  As can be readily seen in Table 6, 
the “discrimination effect” decreases slightly with income but increases substantially with 
educational attainment.  For all groups except high school dropouts, the size of the discrimination 
effect is large: 7–9 percentage points for high school graduates, 9–12 percentage points for those 
with some college training and 17–20 percentage points for those with four year college degrees.  
 
VIII. COMPARING CROSS-SECTIONAL AND PANEL ESTIMATES 
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As noted in the introduction, previous research on racial segregation in housing has used 
cross-sectional data.  A novel aspect of this paper is its use of panel data to study segregation.  This 
section of the paper examines whether the panel nature of the PSID provides some benefit in the 
identification of the “discrimination effect.”  
In the previous section, a fixed effect model specification was chosen because a Hausman 
specification test indicated a statistically significant difference between fixed-effects and random 
effects coefficient estimates.  The implication of this finding is that including between individual 
variation in an estimator of the “discrimination effect”13 leads to biased coefficient estimates.  The 
only type of variation found in cross-sectional data is variation between individuals and thus, cross-
sectional estimates of the impact of discrimination on segregation appear to be problematic.  While 
the Hausman specification test shows that the bias induced by between persons variation is 
statistically significant, it remains to be seen whether this bias is quantitatively important. 
To answer this question, the estimates of the “discrimination effect” derived from the fixed-
effects model are compared with two sets of least squares estimates that are derived from essentially 
the same model minus any individual specific effects.  In one case, the comparison model is 
estimated on the entire sample that was used to estimate the fixed-effects model.  The estimates from 
this model are similar to those derived from a random effects model in that both estimators use 
weight averages of estimates derived from between and within person variation, although the 
weights are different for each.  However, in contrast to the random effects model, the least squares 
estimator does not control for individual heterogeneity.  The advantage of this comparison model is 
its large sample size (all observations in the panel are used).  Its disadvantage is the presence of a 
type of variation (within individual variation) not found in cross-sections.  In the other comparison, 
estimates are derived from a cross-section of the data created by restricting the sample to 
observations from a single year—1980.  Since this sample is restricted to a single year, both the 
individual specific and year dummy variables are removed from the model.  Otherwise, the model 
estimated on this single year cross-section is identical to the fixed-effects model of section VII.  The 
advantage of this comparison model is that, unlike the first comparison model, it truly is a cross-
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13 The random effects estimator uses a weighted mixture of between individual variation and within individual 
variation while the fixed-effects estimator only uses within individual variation. 
section.  However, the disadvantage of this comparison is the small sample size used in the model 
estimation. 
These comparisons abstract from the other principle difference between existing cross-
sectional data sets, such as the decennial census, and a nationally representative panel such as the 
PSID—namely the level of detail available in variables that measure socio-economic status.  Instead, 
the comparisons made in this section consider the effect of controlling for individual heterogeneity 
on the size and sign of estimates of the “discrimination effect” derived from models that contain the 
same variables as the fixed-effects model but no individual specific effects. 
 
The two sets of estimates use a similar model specification and differ only by the sample 
used and the presence of time-specific dummy variables.  Mathematically, the first model is given by 
 
(13) ititiiititiititiitititittit eRBBRXBRXBXRXMSAb +β+β+β+β+β+β+β+β+γ= 76543210
 
where b is the proportion of blacks in a person’s neighborhood, MSA is a dummy variable for each 
metropolitan area in the sample, X is a 1 x 5 vector of socioeconomic variables including the 
family’s income to needs ratio, the education of the head of household and a dummy variable equal 
to one if a person resided in the southern census region, R is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
person rents, B is a dummy variable equal to one if a person is black, and e ~ IID(0, σ ).  It is 
assumed that e is uncorrelated with MSA, B, R, and X.  Variability in neighborhood size induces 
heteroskedasticity in the model that can be corrected by constructing weights in the same fashion as 
before.  The second model is the same as above without γt and without time subscripts. 
2
e
The results from these two comparison models are found in table 7.  The first three columns 
of table 7 reproduce table 6, while the next two columns add the percentage point changes in 
segregation implied by the coefficient estimates from the comparison models.  The coefficient 
estimates of these two models are found in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.  As before, a positive number 
indicates that the extra discrimination found in rental markets is associated with an increase in 
segregation, while a negative number indicates that the extra discrimination in rental markets is 
associated with a decrease in segregation.  Perhaps the most striking result found in both the full 
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panel “cross-sectional” estimates and the 1980 cross-sectional estimates of the “discrimination 
effect” is that at least half of the estimates have the wrong sign.  In these cases, dropping individual 
specific effects result in estimates that imply that increased discrimination is associated with lower 
levels of racial segregation.  Furthermore, even in the cases where the discrimination effect has the 
correct sign, the estimates of the size of the effect appear to suffer from a persistent downward bias.  
The size of the “discrimination effect” is always smaller in the full panel estimates with no fixed-
effects when compared to the full panel estimates with fixed-effects.  Similarly, the estimates of the 
“discrimination effect” derived from the 1980 cross-section are smaller than the fixed-effects 
estimates in 10 of the 12 cases presented in table 7.  The pattern of cross-sectional estimates 
indicates that when individual heterogeneity is ignored no meaningful “discrimination effect” is 
found in the data.  It is also important to note that on average, the fixed-effects estimates of the 
“discrimination effect” in table 7 are 9.8 percentage points higher than the two sets of cross-sectional 
estimates.   
Based on these results, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 1980 cross-section, full panel 
with no fixed-effects and fixed-effects coefficient estimates imply dramatically different response of 
segregation to changes in the rate of discrimination.  Failing to control for individual heterogeneity 
appears to result in a substantial downward bias in the estimated relationship between discrimination 
and racial segregation in housing, at least in the data used in this study. 
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 
Social scientists commonly assume that a reduction in the housing discrimination rate would 
be associated with a large decrease in black-white segregation.  Yet prior to this essay there has not 
been any direct evidence to support this belief.  There is little doubt that a decrease in the 
discrimination rate would have some effect on segregation, but given the state of the current 
literature it would be impossible to deduce whether that effect would be large or small.  This study is 
the first to quantify the relationship between a discrete change in the discrimination rate and a 
corresponding change in racial segregation in housing. 
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Audit studies reveal that the rate of discrimination is higher in rental housing than in owner-
occupied housing.  Thus, the effect of racial discrimination on segregation is quantified by observing 
individuals who change housing market types while living in the same metropolitan area while 
holding constant other relevant factors. 
This is also the first study of racial segregation to use panel data.  Previous studies have not 
used panel data because conventional measures of racial segregation are not defined over nationally 
representative surveys such as the PSID.  A new measure of racial segregation is developed which 
can be applied to survey data.  This new measure is the expected proportion of blacks in a black 
person’s neighborhood conditional on a number of socioeconomic variables minus the same 
conditional expectation for a white person with the identical socioeconomic background.   
Racial segregation is estimated controlling for individual heterogeneity in the propensity to 
live in neighborhoods with a high black proportion through the use of fixed-effects.  In this model, 
the decrease in discrimination from the level observed in rental housing to that observed in owner-
occupied housing is associated with a 1–4 percentage point drop in segregation for individuals with 
no high school diploma, a 7–9 percentage point drop in segregation for individuals with a high 
school diploma, a 9–12 percentage point drop in segregation for individuals with some college 
training, and a 17–20 percentage point drop in segregation for individuals with a four-year college 
degree. 
There are two striking features of these estimates.  First, the effect of the additional 
discrimination in rental markets on racial segregation is not only statistically significant but, except 
for high school dropouts, substantial.  Second, the size of this effect varies tremendously with 
educational status and to a lesser degree with income.  At this time it is difficult to know what 
accounts for this variation in the “discrimination effect.”  One possible explanation may be that the 
housing search techniques used by lower education and high education blacks differ.  In fact, Farley, 
Bianchi and Colasanto [1979] have found that blacks with higher educational attainments are more 
likely to utilize realtors than blacks with lower educational attainments.  Nevertheless, this one study 
is merely suggestive, not conclusive.  Given what is little is known about minority housing search 
techniques (and other possible factors that might interact with the discrimination rate to produce 
these effects), anything more than speculative explanation of this variation will have to be left to 
future research efforts. 
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In the last part of this paper the empirical importance of controlling for individual 
heterogeneity is assessed by examining the difference in segregation across housing markets using 
two sets of cross-sectional estimates.  The unobserved variable bias in the cross-sectional coefficient 
estimates is severe.  In most cases examined, the cross-sectional coefficient estimates implied that 
the increased discrimination in rental markets compared to sales markets either decreased racial 
segregation or had no measurable effect.  On average, the cross-sectional estimates of the 
“discrimination effect” were 9.8 percentage points lower than their fixed-effects counterparts.  The 
size and persistence of this bias suggests that future research on the relationship between racial 
segregation and racial discrimination should emphasize the use of panel, as opposed to cross-
sectional, data. 
Appendix I: The Choice of a Linear Probability Specification 
 
The linearity assumption used in both these models, as opposed to a generalized linear model 
such as a logit or probit, is admittedly unrealistic but is maintained for three reasons.  First, 
experimentation has revealed that alternatives such as a probit for grouped data do not produce 
reasonable predicted values for white respondents.  Predicted values for whites from a probit for 
grouped data are tightly clustered about 0.1 percent, which is far from the sample mean of five 
percent.  
Second, not only are these estimates unrealistically small, they are not responsive to changes 
in socio-economic variables.  The effect of statistically significant coefficients on education and 
income variables are overwhelmed by the coefficients for whites, which do not vary with economic 
status.  In effect using a probit for grouped data forces the researcher to ignore the variation in the 
percentage of blacks for whites when computing segregation. 
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Third, the effect of discrimination on segregation is not identified in a generalized linear 
model with fixed-effects but is identified in a linear model with fixed-effects.  A well known 
property of fixed-effects model is that parameters on time invariant variables, such as the black 
dummy variable, are not identified.  In the linear model it is not necessary to know the coefficient on 
the black dummy variable in order to calculate ∆r(X) – ∆h(X).  This difference can be calculated 
simply by summing and subtracting the appropriate coefficients.  However, this is not the case for a 
generalized linear model with fixed-effects.  In a generalized linear model, the difference in two 
predicted values depends not only on the size of the coefficients on the variables that change but also 
depends on the level of the constant terms taken as arguments to the non-linear link function.  
To see this, consider a generalized linear model with fixed-effects 
 
ititiiit RBgb ε+β+β+µ= )( 21  
 
where g is a non-linear link function such as a logit or normal cdf, µi is the fixed effect, Bi is a 
dummy variable equal to one if person i is black and Rit is a dummy variable equal to one if person i 
rents at time t.  For each individual µi + Biβ1 is identified but not β1.  One cannot ignore these terms 
because the difference in predicted values for renters and homeowners will depend on the level of 
this intercept.  For instance assume that β1 = β2 = 1 and that g is the standard normal cdf.  Then 
segregation among renters is given by g(1 + 1) – g(1) = 0.977 – 0.841 = 0.136.  Now suppose β1 = 
0.1.  Then segregation among renters is given by g(0.1 + 1) – g(1) = 0.844 – 0.841 = 0.003.  As such, 
defining a segregation measure which can be generalized to the population at large is impossible 
because one cannot abstract from unique individual effects. 
Appendix II:  Supplemental Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1.  Full Panel Estimates Without Fixed-effects 
Variable Coefficient Standard error P Value 
Number of observations 25,297   
R2 0.8239   
Root MSE 42.066   
Chicago 0.0422 0.0049 0.00 
1985 0.0045 0.0022 0.05 
Income to needs –0.0013 0.0003 0.00 
High school 0.0066 0.0016 0.00 
Some college –0.0027 0.0015 0.07 
College 0.0059 0.0017 0.00 
South 0.1283 0.0020 0.00 
Black 0.7514 0.0085 0.00 
Rent 0.0340 0.0048 0.00 
Rent × income to needs –0.0013 0.0007 0.09 
Rent × high school –0.0310 0.0047 0.00 
Rent × some college –0.0111 0.0052 0.03 
Rent × college –0.0091 0.0056 0.10 
Rent × south –0.0058 0.0052 0.26 
Black × income to needs –0.0054 0.0027 0.04 
Black × high school –0.1023 0.0082 0.00 
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Black × some college –0.0838 0.0129 0.00 
Black × college –0.2818 0.0210 0.00 
Black × south –0.1745 0.0087 0.00 
Black × rent × income to needs –0.0164 0.0038 0.00 
Black × rent × high school 0.0728 0.0117 0.00 
Black × rent × some college 0.0054 0.0174 0.76 
Black × rent × college 0.0782 0.0293 0.01 
Black × rent × south 0.0460 0.0107 0.00 
Black × rent 0.0034 0.0112 0.76 
Notes:  The model includes dummy variables for each year and each metropolitan area found in 
the sample.  The estimates for all years and metropolitan areas are suppressed except for Chicago 
and 1985.  Dependent variable is the percentage of blacks in an individual’s census tract or 
enumeration district of residence. 
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Appendix Table 2.  Cross Sectional Estimates for 1980 
Variable Coefficient Standard error P Value 
Number of observations 2,057   
R2 0.5453   
Income to needs –0.001 0.000 0.001 
High school 0.004 0.003 0.273 
Some college 0.008 0.004 0.035 
College 0.015 0.005 0.001 
South 0.072 0.008 0.000 
Black 0.764 0.079 0.000 
Rent 0.002 0.010 0.813 
Rent × income to needs 0.000 0.001 0.848 
Rent × high school 0.004 0.011 0.693 
Rent × some college 0.000 0.011 0.984 
Rent × college –0.026 0.012 0.035 
Rent × south 0.061 0.010 0.000 
Black × income to needs –0.025 0.024 0.293 
Black × high school –0.093 0.071 0.191 
Black × some college –0.082 0.101 0.419 
Black × college –0.234 0.180 0.195 
Black × south –0.133 0.076 0.081 
Black × rent × income to needs –0.037 0.037 0.319 
Black × rent × high school 0.131 0.099 0.187 
Black × rent × some college –0.017 0.143 0.904 
Black × rent × college 0.063 0.244 0.797 
Black × rent × south –0.056 0.088 0.525 
Black × rent 0.021 0.101 0.837 
Note:  Dependent variable is the percentage of blacks in an individual’s census tract or 
enumeration district of residence. 
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Table 1. Nationwide Studies of Racial Discrimination in Housing 
 
 
HUD, 1977 
(Wienk et 
al.[1979]) 
HUD, 1989 
(Yinger [1992]) 
Local housing 
authorities, 1980s 
(Galster [1990] ) 
    
Number of metropolitan areas 40 20 5 (sales), 
19 (rental) 
    
Rental housing    
Number of audits 1577 801 142 
   % White favored 48 40.1 — 
   % Black favored 21 18.8 — 
   Net difference 27 21.3 47 
   Logit — 46.9 — 
    
Owner-occupied housing    
   Number of audits 1641 1081 1529 
   % White favored 39 35.7 — 
   % Black favored 24 17.7 — 
   Net difference 15 18.0 21 
   Logit — 34.2 — 
Note: Measures of discrimination refer to discrimination in housing availability. 
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Table 2.  Equality of Means Tests for Discrimination Rates in Sales and Rental Markets 
 P-value of hypothesis that discrimination in rental and 
sales market is equal 
  
HUD, 1977 
(Wienk, et al. [1979]) 
0.00 
  
HUD, 1989 
(Yinger, [1991]) 
0.07 
  
Local housing authorities, 1980s  
(Galster, [1990]) 
0.00 
  
Above studies considered jointly 0.00 
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Table 3.  Summary Statistics 
 Full data Rent = 0 Rent = 1 Black = 0 Black = 1 
Variable Mean (Std. dev.) 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
Mean 
(Std. dev.) 
Number of Observations 25,297 14,459 10,838 13,064 12,233 
      
Number of individuals in panel 3,837     
      
Average number of years in panel 6.59     
      
Percent black 0.3666 0.2958 0.4610 0.0518 0.7027 
 (0.3973) (0.3734) (0.4084) (0.1258) (0.3011) 
      
Income to needs 2.831 3.258 2.262 3.630 1.978 
 (2.058) (2.210) (1.676) (2.247) (1.399) 
      
High school 0.3053 0.2905 0.3252 0.2907 0.3209 
 (0.4606) (0.4540) (0.4685) (0.4541) (0.4669) 
      
Some college 0.1491 0.1495 0.1486 0.1849 0.1109 
 (0.3562) (0.3566) (0.3557) (0.3882) (0.3141) 
      
College 0.1453 0.1729 0.1084 0.2446 0.0392 
 (0.3524) (0.3782) (0.3109) (0.4298) (0.1942) 
      
South 0.4245 0.4042 0.4515 0.2850 0.5734 
 (0.4943) (0.4908) (0.4977) (0.4514) (0.4946) 
      
Black 0.4836 0.3980 0.5978 0 1 
 (0.4997) (0.4895) (0.4904) (0) (0) 
      
Rent 0.4284 0 1 0.3337 0.5296 
 (0.4949) (0) (0) (0.4715) (0.4991) 
      
Percentage of renters in census tract 0.3703 
(0.2001) 
0.3114 
(0.1738) 
0.4575 
(0.2046) 
0.3160 
(0.1854) 
0.4444 
(0.1957) 
      
Number of individuals in census tract or 
ED 
5,326 
(2,800) 
5,388 
(2,860) 
5,244 
(2,715) 
5,403 
(2,955) 
5,244 
(2,622) 
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Table 4.  The Effect of Homeownership on Segregation: A Simple Approach 
 Row No high school diploma 
High school 
diploma 
Some  
college 
College  
degree 
      
Black renters A 0.769 0.703 0.658 0.538 
      
White renters B 0.088 0.050 0.050 0.065 
      
Segregation, ∆(X) C = A – B 0.681 0.653 0.608 0.493 
      
Black homeowners D 0.730 0.632 0.626 0.424 
      
White homeowners E 0.056 0.027 0.030 0.038 
      
Segregation, ∆(X) F = D – E 0.674 0.605 0.596 0.386 
      
Change in segregation G = C – F 0.007 0.048 0.012 0.107 
Note: Table entries are the average percentage of blacks in a person’s neighborhood by race and educational 
attainment.  Segregation is measured as the difference in the mean neighborhood black proportion for blacks and 
whites with the same educational attainment. Row C = Row A – Row B gives segregation for renters.  Row F = Row 
D – Row E gives segregation for homeowners.  The means reported are unweighted.  The change in segregation 
associated with homeownership is the difference in difference, Row C – Row F. 
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Table 5.  Fixed-effects Estimates 
Variable Coefficient Standard error P Value 
Number of observations 25,297   
R2 0.9083   
    
Income to needs –0.001 0.001 0.104 
High school –0.003 0.008 0.705 
Some college –0.006 0.009 0.530 
College –0.017 0.012 0.136 
South –0.113 0.038 0.003 
Rent 0.029 0.008 0.000 
    
Rent × income to needs 0.001 0.001 0.385 
Rent × high school –0.034 0.008 0.000 
Rent × some college –0.030 0.008 0.000 
Rent × college –0.047 0.009 0.000 
Rent × south 0.040 0.007 0.000 
    
Black × income to needs –0.002 0.002 0.297 
Black × high school 0.012 0.011 0.279 
Black × some college 0.068 0.014 0.000 
Black × college 0.038 0.023 0.102 
Black × south –0.156 0.069 0.023 
    
Black × rent × income to needs –0.014 0.002 0.000 
Black × rent × high school 0.053 0.011 0.000 
Black × rent × some college 0.078 0.013 0.000 
Black × rent × college 0.154 0.018 0.000 
Black × rent × south –0.061 0.009 0.000 
Black × rent 0.055 0.010 0.000 
Note: Dependent variable is the percentage of blacks in an individual=s census tract or enumeration district of 
residence. 
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Table 6.  Implied Percentage Point Changes in Segregation from Fixed-effects Regression, 
∆r(X) - ∆h(X) 
Education Income Fixed-effects 
No high school diploma 1 0.04 
 2 0.03 
 3 0.01 
   
High school diploma 1 0.09 
 2 0.08 
 3 0.07 
   
Some college 1 0.12 
 2 0.11 
 3 0.09 
   
College 1 0.20 
 2 0.18 
 3 0.17 
Note: Predicted values are calculated for individuals not living in the south. 
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Table 7.  Implied Percentage Point Changes in Segregation, ∆r(X) – ∆h(X)  
Education Income to needs ratio 
Fixed 
effects 
Full panel, no 
fixed-effects 
1980 
Cross-section 
No high school diploma 1 0.04 –0.01 –0.02 
 2 0.03 –0.03 –0.05 
 3 0.01 –0.05 –0.09 
     
High school diploma 1 0.09 0.06 0.12 
 2 0.08 0.04 0.08 
 3 0.07 0.03 0.04 
     
Some college 1 0.12 –0.01 –0.03 
 2 0.11 –0.02 –0.07 
 3 0.09 –0.04 –0.11 
     
College 1 0.20 0.07 0.05 
 2 0.18 0.05 0.01 
 3 0.17 0.03 -0.03 
Note: Predicted values are calculated for individuals not living in the south. 
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